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INTRODUCTION
Two employees arrive at work half an hour late. It is both
employees' first offense, and each is dealt with separately by the
same supervisor. The first employee tells the supervisor that an
alcoholic binge the preceding night caused her to oversleep. The
supervisor fires her, explaining that it is company policy to
terminate an employee who is late without a valid excuse. The
second employee tells the supervisor that he is late for work
because he overslept. This employee, however, receives only a
verbal warning and suffers no further punishment.
Under traditional discrimination law, these facts would state
a straightforward case of discrimination against the first
employee on the basis of alcoholism. The employer's proffered
reason for firing the first employee (oversleeping) would be
considered a pretext-a false reason given by the employer to
hide the true reason-and this would be proven by the employer's
decision not to fire the otherwise similarly situated second
employee. Under many courts' approaches to alcohol-related
misconduct, though, the case of the first employee would be
dismissed.
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Alcoholism is a disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act.1  The
circuits, however, are split on whether the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act cover employees' misconduct that arises
because of their alcoholism.2 This Article focuses on the possible
claims of an alcoholic under the ADA, how different circuits
approach alcohol-related employee misconduct, how the Supreme
Court has implicitly dealt with the issue, and what the proper
approach should be.
These issues arise in situations such as when an alcoholic
employee misses work because of a hangover or because of still
being drunk from the night before. This misconduct is the direct
result of the employee's disability. Nevertheless, non-disabled
employees are held accountable for this same misconduct. Would
it be fair to allow alcoholic employees to get away with this type
of misconduct, while not allowing the same result with non-
disabled employees? If so, should an alcoholic's misconduct be
excused indefinitely, or should employers be permitted to
condition an alcoholic's future employment on successful
rehabilitative treatment?
Courts have reached different results in answering questions
similar to these. Most courts distinguish between the disability
and disability-related misconduct. These courts hold that an
adverse employment action because of disability-related
misconduct is "Not Because of the Disability."3 Other courts do
not distinguish between the disability and the disability-related
misconduct. These courts hold that an adverse employment
action because of disability-related misconduct is "Because of the
Disability."4  In other disability cases, outside the disability-
related misconduct context, courts only require the employee to
1 See, e.g., Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); Crewe v. U.S.
Office Pers. Mgmt., 834 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987).
2 Compare Hamilton v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the ADA does not cover disability-related misconduct), and Den Hartog
v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that the ADA does
not cover alcoholism-related misconduct), with Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the ADA covers misconduct
that arises because of the disability).
3 See, e.g., Pernice v. City of Chi., 237 F.3d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 2001).
4 See, e.g., Teahan, 951 F.2d at 514.
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show evidence that creates an "Inference of' disability
discrimination to prove his or her prima facie case. 5
A student comment has provided a broad overview of how
courts treat alcohol-related misconduct under the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA,6 and a journal article has addressed disability-
related misconduct in general. 7 Another author has addressed
the difficulty of proving that alcoholism substantially limits a
major life activity.8  None of these articles, however, have
analyzed the proper framework that courts should use to protect
disabled alcoholic employees when these employees engage in
alcohol-related misconduct.
This Article argues that courts should apply the "Inference
of' approach to disability-related misconduct cases-that the
duty to reasonably accommodate should arise when the employer
suspects the misconduct is alcohol-related, and that the employer
should be permitted to give an alcoholic employee a "firm choice"
between rehabilitative treatment and termination. Part I sets
out the statutory background of the ADA, looking at the different
possible claims of an alcoholic employee. Part II describes how
different courts have treated disability-related misconduct and
other disability claims. Part III focuses on how the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue and how that has affected the
different approaches. Finally, Part IV analyzes which approach
fits best with the goals of the ADA and which is best suited to
deal with the needs of both the employer and employee. It also
discusses what should constitute "reasonable accommodation" for
the alcoholic employee and when it should be required.
5 See, e.g., Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (8th Cir.
1998).
6 See James P. Sadler, Comment, The Alcoholic and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: The "Booze Made Me Do It" Argument Finds Little
Recognition in Employment Discrimination Actions, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 861, 872-
73 (1997).
7 See Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2005).
8 See Judith J. Johnson, Rescue the Americans with Disabilities Act from
Restrictive Interpretations: Alcoholism as an Illustration, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 169,
217-21 (2007).
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I. BACKGROUND: ADA AND REHABILITATION ACT CLAIMS BASED
ON EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT
In 1990, approximately forty-three million Americans
suffered from some physical or mental disability.9 Unfortunately,
these disabled Americans were being discriminated against by
society in the employment context.10 This unfair and
unnecessary discrimination denied the disabled the equal
opportunity to compete for employment, and cost the United
States billions of dollars resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity. 1' In an effort to address this discrimination,
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199012
and its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act. 13
A. Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 197314 to provide
rehabilitation for, 15 and to prevent discrimination against,
disabled persons by affording them equal opportunities in
federally-funded programs. 16 The ADA was modeled after. the
Rehabilitation Act 17 and should not be construed to apply a lesser
standard.18 The ADA was meant to expand to the private sector
the protections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which only
protected employees of the federal government, the U.S. Postal
Service, federal contractors, and entities receiving federal
9 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000).
10 See id. § 12101(a)(2)-(3).
11 See id. § 12101(a)(9).
12 See id. §§ 12101-12213.
13 See R. Bales, Student Article, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 167-68 (1992).
14 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. (87
Stat.) 409, 410-11 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (2000)).
15 See 119 CONG. REC. 24,571 (1973).
16 S. REP. No. 93-1297 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388.
For this reason, a disproportionately large number of Rehabilitation Act cases are
public sector cases, mostly brought by employees of the United States Postal Service.
That Rehabilitation Act defendants are often public sector employers, however, does
not distinguish such cases from those in which the defendant is a private sector
employer.
17 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(2), 791, 793-94 (2000).
18 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000).
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funds. 19 This allowed courts to use Rehabilitation Act authority
to interpret the ADA.20
B. ADA Definitions
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that
"[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual."21  The ADA only protects "qualified individual[s]
with a disability."22  A "disability" is "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual. '23 A "[q]ualified individual with a
disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires." 24 The law is well settled that alcoholism is a disability
and that an alcoholic may be a "qualified individual with a
disability"25 as long as the alcoholism substantially limits a major
life activity.26
The ADA explicitly allows an employer to hold an alcoholic
or drug-addicted employee to the same qualification standards
for employment or job performance and behavior to which it
holds other employees, even if the alcoholic or drug-addicted
employee's misconduct is related to the disability.27 This makes
it important to determine when an adverse employment action
because of disability-related misconduct will constitute an ADA
claim. To have an ADA claim, an employee must also prove, in
addition to having a qualifying disability, that an adverse
employment action was taken "because of the [employee's]
disability."2 If the employee is discriminated against "because
19 JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 870 (6th ed. 2007).
20 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
21 Id. § 12112(a).
22 Id.
23 Id. § 12102(2)(A).
24 Id. § 12111(8).
25 See, e.g., Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); Crewe v. U.S.
Office Pers. Mgmt., 834 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987).
26 See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316, 316 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997); see
also Johnson, supra note 8, at 217 (asserting that "virtually all courts now generally
find that alcoholics are not significantly limited in any major life activity").
27 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2000).
28 Id. § 12112(a).
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of... [a] disability," then the employee has three possible
discrimination claims: disparate treatment, failure to provide
reasonable accommodations, and disparate impact. 29
C. Types of Disability Claims
1. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination on the
basis of a disability.30 It "is the most easily understood type of
discrimination," where the employer treats a disabled employee
less favorably than others because of that employee's disability. 31
An employer is only liable for disparate treatment when the
disability actually motivated the employment decision. 32
Generally, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
applies to ADA disparate treatment claims.33  Under that
analysis, plaintiffs first carry the burden of raising a genuine
issue of material fact for each element of their prima facie case. 34
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA,
many courts have held that plaintiffs must show
"(1) that... [they are] disabled within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) that... [they are] qualified, with or without reasonable
accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held
or desired; and (3) that ... [they were] discriminated against
because of ... [their] disability."35 The burden-shifting approach
was developed in Title VII cases to allow plaintiffs without direct
evidence of discrimination to create an inference of
discrimination using circumstantial evidence. 36 The problem
with this version of an ADA prima facie case is that it requires
plaintiffs to prove that they were discriminated against because
of their disability, which requires direct evidence. 37 Recognizing
this problem, some courts have changed the third element of a
plaintiffs prima facie case to require the plaintiff to make a
29 Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2003).
30 Id. at 1188.
31 Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
32 Id.
33 Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1189.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1188 (quoting McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 2001)).
36 Timmons, supra note 7, at 196; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
37 Timmons, supra note 7, at 196-97.
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showing that gives rise to an "inference of' discrimination on the
basis of the disability. 38
Under this analysis, "[i]f [the] plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision."39  If the employer-defendant is successful in
articulating "a nondiscriminatory reason, [then] the burden
shifts back to [the] plaintiff to show ... [that] the defendant's
reason for the adverse employment action is pretextual."40
The disparate treatment theory furthers the goal of equal
treatment of disabled employees, while the reasonable
accommodation and disparate impact theories further the goal of
equal opportunity.41 The latter two theories require the employer
to change its policies when the equal treatment of all employees
denies disabled employees equal opportunity. 42
2. Reasonable Accommodation
A discrimination claim can also be made under the ADA for
failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. 43 This is because
the ADA defines discrimination in part as "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability... unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity."44 The ADA also
prohibits denying employment opportunities to an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability because that individual
would require reasonable accommodation. 45
Generally, employees must inform the employer of their
disability and request an accommodation before the employer
must accommodate them.46  This duty of reasonable
accommodation is prospective because an employer must
38 Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 395 (N.D. Iowa
1995) (emphasis omitted).
39 Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1189.
40 Id.
41 See Timmons, supra note 7, at 198.
42 See id.
43 See Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1188-89.
44 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
45 See id.
46 See Robin v. Espo Eng'g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 2000).
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accommodate only the known limitations of the disability. 47 This
also means that an employer is not required, as part of its duty of
reasonable accommodation, to give an employee a "second
chance" after being terminated. 48
3. Disparate Impact
Under the disparate impact theory, discrimination on the
basis of a disability includes the use of "qualification
standards ... or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability."49 Disparate impact
claims arise when an employment practice is neutral on its face
but, in effect, it is harsher on a protected group and it cannot be
justified by business necessity. 50 Under this theory, "a facially
neutral employment practice may be [illegally discriminatory]
without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to
discriminate, which is required in a 'disparate treatment' case."51
A disparate impact claim, however, cannot be brought by an
alcoholic or drug-addicted employee because the ADA explicitly
allows employers to hold alcoholic and drug-addicted employees
to the same standards as other employees.52 This means that a
facially neutral policy will not be an ADA violation, even if that
policy has a harsher effect on alcoholics or drug addicts than it
does on other employees. ADA disparate impact claims will not
be discussed further in this Article because they are barred to
alcoholic employees.
II. APPROACHES TO DISABILITY-RELATED MISCONDUCT
Federal courts have held that alcoholism is a protected
disability under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act,53 and it is clear
that Congress intended it that way. 54 However, alcohol-related
47 See Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
48 See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (5th Cir. 1997).
49 Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)).
5o See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
51 Id. at 52-53.
52 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4).
53 See, e.g., Renaud v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs., 203 F.3d 723, 729-30 (10th
Cir. 2000); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); Crewe v. U.S. Office
Pers. Mgmt., 834 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987).
54 See generally Johnson, supra note 8, at 171 nn.9-10.
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misconduct is not always protected. Employees fired for alcohol-
related misconduct are limited to two of the three possible ADA
claims. They are prohibited from bringing a disparate impact
claim, 55 so they must rely on disparate treatment and reasonable
accommodation claims. These two claims must receive the
proper safeguards; otherwise alcoholic employees could end up
being a protected class under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
with no claim for discrimination. The circuits are split on the
proper approach to disparate treatment and reasonable
accommodation claims when the adverse employment action is
because of alcoholic-related misconduct.
A majority of courts make it difficult, if not impossible, for
employees fired for alcohol-related misconduct to bring disparate
treatment claims because these courts require employees to
prove through direct evidence that they were fired because of
their disability and not due to their misconduct. These courts
have a per se rule that an adverse employment action because of
alcoholic-related misconduct is "Not Because of the Disability."56
Other courts have a per se rule that an adverse employment
action because of alcoholic-related misconduct is "Because of the
Disability."57 This allows employees to establish a prima facie
case of disability discrimination if they are "otherwise qualified."
This prevents the employer from using the misconduct as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason because it is not
distinguished from the disability. One scholar has argued that
the Supreme Court implicitly has rejected this approach. 58
Some courts, outside of the disability-related misconduct
context, require employees to prove that they were terminated
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of disability
discrimination. 59  Applied to the alcohol-related misconduct
context, this "Inference of' approach allows employees fired for
alcohol-related misconduct to prove a prima facie case with
circumstantial evidence of disability discrimination. It allows the
55 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4).
56 See Pernice v. City of Chi., 237 F.3d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 2001).
57 See Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir.
1991).
58 See Timmons, supra note 7, at 235.
59 See Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021, 1023 (8th Cir.
1998) (explaining how an employee "must present evidence that 'creates a
reasonable inference that [his disability] was a determinative factor in the adverse
employment decision' ").
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employer to offer the misconduct as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, while also giving the employee the
opportunity to prove that the reason given is merely a pretext for
disability discrimination.
As discussed in Part I, the only other possible claim the
employee fired for alcoholic-related misconduct may have is a
reasonable accommodation claim. Some courts require the
employee to put the employer on notice before the employer has a
duty to reasonably accommodate. Other courts place this duty on
the employer once the employer suspects the misconduct is
reasonably related to a disability.
A. Disparate Treatment
1. "Not Because of the Disability" Approach
In the alcoholism and drug-addiction context, most courts
have distinguished the disability from disability-related
misconduct. For example, in Pernice v. City of Chicago, Daniel
Pernice, a drug addict employed by the City of Chicago's
Department of Aviation ("City of Chicago"), was arrested and
charged with possession of cocaine. 60  The City of Chicago
charged Pernice with several violations of city personnel rules
because of his arrest and he was subsequently terminated. 61
Pernice filed a complaint contending that his "drug addiction
created a wholly involuntary need to possess drugs," and that he
was terminated because of this compulsion. 62 The Seventh
Circuit rejected this argument, distinguishing between a cause
and a compulsion. 63 The court found that even if his drug
addiction created an involuntary need to possess drugs, he
nonetheless made a conscious choice to actually possess them. 64
Therefore, the court had little trouble separating the misconduct
from the disability and allowing the employer to punish for
misconduct without discriminating because of the disability.65
60 Pernice, 237 F.3d at 784.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 785.
63 Id. at 786. To illustrate the difference between a cause and a compulsion, the
Pernice court discussed its holding in Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635
(7th Cir. 1995), where it agreed with a worker's argument that his alleged
alcoholism caused him to lose his license. Id.
64 Id. at 787.
65 Id.
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Similarly, in Little v. F.B.I., a special agent with the FBI was
terminated after numerous off-duty incidents resulting from his
alcoholism, culminating with being intoxicated while at work. 66
The plaintiff then brought a claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
alleging that he was fired because of his alcoholism, while the
FBI claimed he was fired for his misconduct of being intoxicated
at work.67 The lower court found that the plaintiff was actually
terminated because of his inability to conform to the FBI's
established standards by coming to work intoxicated, not because
he was an alcoholic. 68  The Fourth Circuit agreed, and
determined that his discharge was because of his misconduct, not
his alcoholism. 69
Some circuits have held that absenteeism is misconduct and
therefore unprotected by the ADA. For instance, in Leary v.
Dalton, a Navy employee was fired for missing work because he
was incarcerated after being arrested for driving while
intoxicated ("DWI"). 70 The plaintiff argued that he was fired due
to his disability, because his alcoholism had led to his DWI
causing his excessive absences, which led to his termination.7 1
The First Circuit disagreed, holding that he was fired for
breaking reasonable Navy rules against unapproved absences
and not because of his alcoholism. 72
These courts failed to go through the correct burden-shifting
framework and seemed to apply a per se rule that these
employees were fired because of their misconduct and "Not
Because of their Disability." This rationale leaves the employees
unable to make the causal connection required for a disparate
treatment claim. Many of these courts have relied on the
provision of the ADA that allows employers to hold alcoholic
employees to the same behavior and performance standards that
they hold other employees, even if the misbehavior is related to
the alcoholism. 73 The ADA provision, however, only explicitly
prohibits disparate impact claims because it allows employers to
hold alcoholic employees to the same standards as other
66 Little v. F.B.I., 1 F.3d 255, 256-57 (4th Cir. 1993).
67 Id. at 257.
68 Id. at 259.
69 Id.
70 Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 750 (1st Cir. 1995).
71 Id. at 751.
72 Id. at 754.
73 Id.
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employees, even if the misconduct is related to the alcoholism. 74
This prohibits employees from bringing claims when the
employer has facially neutral standards that have a disparate
impact on alcoholic employees.
This ADA provision, however, does not allow employers to
intentionally discriminate against employees because they are
alcoholics. Furthermore, the cases discussed above involve either
illegal conduct or conduct prohibited by workplace rules, which
are both valid reasons for employee termination. In cases where
the misconduct is not so egregious, such as absenteeism or
tardiness caused by alcoholism, the employee must be protected
from pretextual discrimination by applying the proper burden-
shifting analysis. For example, the alcoholic employee from the
introductory hypothetical should be given the opportunity to
prove that the reason given for his or her termination was a
pretext for the actual reason of being an alcoholic. The courts in
Pernice, Little, and Leary, though, would say that once the
employer has shown that the employee has engaged in
misconduct, the case is over and the termination is per se "Not
Because of the Disability."
2. "Because of the Disability" Approach
a. Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.
Not all courts hold that disability-related misconduct falls
completely outside the protection of the ADA. In Teahan v.
Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., John Teahan, an alcoholic,
was employed by Metro-North Commuter Railroad ("Metro-
North") as a telegraph and telephone maintainer.75 Between
1983 and 1988, his alcoholism and drug abuse led to excessive
unexcused absences. 76 On March 7, 1986, Teahan voluntarily
enrolled in a 30-day rehabilitation program, but after being
discharged from the program, he relapsed into further drug and
alcohol abuse resulting in continued absences.77 Metro-North
responded to Teahan's continued unauthorized absences
with progressive discipline, including warning letters and
74 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2000).
75 Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1991).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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suspensions. 78  Teahan finally informed Metro-North of his
substance abuse problem in the late fall of 1987. 79
Teahan was absent without permission for four days in
December of 1987, and on December 28, 1987, Metro-North sent
a charge letter notifying him that his continued unauthorized
absences constituted excessive absenteeism.80 On that same day,
before receiving the letter, Teahan had voluntarily entered into a
second substance abuse rehabilitation program, which he
successfully completed.8' Following the charge letter, Metro-
North pursued Teahan's dismissal under the collective
bargaining agreement disciplinary procedures.8 2 It was only
because of this collective bargaining agreement that Teahan was
permitted to return to work on January 28, 1988, while his
dismissal was being reviewed.8 3 Teahan was not absent from
work again until his appeals were exhausted and he was
successfully dismissed by Metro-North on April 11, 1988.84
Teahan sued under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
claiming that Metro-North discriminated against him by firing
him "'solely by reason of his handicap."8 5 The district court
granted Metro-North's motion for summary judgment, holding
that Metro-North had not relied on Teahan's disability and had
fired him for his excessive absenteeism, "a nondiscriminatory
reason."8 6  This shifted the burden to Teahan to prove that
Metro-North's asserted reason was pretextual.8 7 Teahan failed to
meet this burden; therefore, Metro-North was granted summary
judgment.88
Teahan appealed, arguing that his absenteeism was "caused
by" his substance abuse problem and since his termination was
based on that excessive absenteeism, the district court
improperly shifted the burden to him to prove pretext.8 9 The
Second Circuit agreed, holding that termination by an employer
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 Id. at 514.
86 Id.
87 See id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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which is based on absenteeism that is "shown to be caused by
substance abuse is termination 'solely by reason' of that
substance abuse for purposes of' the Rehabilitation Act.9 0
The Teahan court reasoned that allowing an employer to
"rely" on any conduct that is disability-related would allow the
employer to avoid the burden of proving that the disability is
relevant to the job qualifications. 91  It found that disability-
related misconduct becomes relevant when determining whether
the employee is "otherwise qualified," but not when determining
the reason for the termination.92 The relevant inquiry, the court
stated, was into the causal connection between the absences and
the alcohol abuse.93 If the employee's alcoholism caused only a
small percentage of the absences, and a significant number of the
absences were caused by something else, then the termination
would not be "solely by reason of' the disability.94
b. Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of the Senate
Fair Employment Practices
Other courts have also supported the minority view that the
relevant inquiry for disability-related absenteeism is to
determine whether the employee is "otherwise qualified" and not
to determine the reason for the termination. 95 In Office of the
Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of the Senate Fair Employment
Practices, William L. Singer was employed by a branch of the
Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms ("SAA") as a dispatcher. 96
Although his performance at work was excellent, he had a
problem with violating SAA's attendance policy.9 7 After receiving
notice of termination for his excessive absences on October 28,
90 Id. at 517; see Mercado v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 95 CIV. 10018(LAP),
1998 WL 151039, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (questioning whether Teahan still
survives under the ADA because its holding was based on the pre-1992
Rehabilitation Act, which did not contain the ADA provision explicitly authorizing
employers to hold employees with alcoholism or drug addiction to the same conduct
standards as other employees).
91 Teahan, 951 F.2d at 517.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 See Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Fritz v. Mascotech Auto. Sys. Group,
Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1481, 1489 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
96 See Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms, 95 F.3d at 1104.
97 See id.
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1993, Singer told his supervisor the reason for his absences was
his alcoholism, which he had previously denied. 98 The SAA
imposed a last-chance agreement on Singer, which required him
to attend a substance dependency recovery program. 99
Nonetheless, this agreement did not provide for retroactive relief,
and so Singer filed an employment discrimination claim. 100
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that
an alcoholic employee, whose only problem in performing the
essential job functions was his ability to regularly report to work,
was able to regularly report to work when he was reasonably
accommodated by being allowed to attend treatment. Therefore,
he was considered a "qualified individual with a disability." 10 1
The court also found that a "firm choice" between treatment and
discipline was consistent with a reasonable accommodation. 10 2
Like the majority of courts, Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms
treated attendance as an essential function of the job;10 3 however,
unlike the majority, it put more of an emphasis on the ADA's
more expansive concept of "the employer's duty to reasonably
accommodate the disabled employee."' 0 4
Both Teahan and Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms held
that termination for disability-related absenteeism was "Because
of the Disability" if the employee was otherwise qualified. 10 5 The
court in Office of the Senate Sergeant At Arms, however, limited
its holding to absenteeism, while Teahan seems to apply to all
disability-related conduct. 10 6  Both Teahan and Office of the
Senate Sergeant at Arms support the theory that disability-
related absenteeism should be analyzed when determining
whether the employee is qualified for the job and should not be
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 Id. at 1106.
102 Id. at 1107.
103 Id. at 1106.
104 See Sadler, supra note 6, at 872.
105 See Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms, 95 F.3d at 1106; Teahan v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
"termination by an employer.., which is justified as being due to absenteeism
shown to be caused by substance abuse is termination 'solely by reason of that
substance abuse").
106 Compare Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms, 95 F.3d at 1106, with Teahan,
951 F.2d at 517.
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separated from the actual disability. 10 7  Office of the Senate
Sergeant at Arms, though, focuses more on whether the employee
is qualified with reasonable accommodation,1 0 8 which is more
consistent with the ADA's requirement of reasonable
accommodation than both the majority approach and Teahan.1 09
3. "Inference of' Approach
In other ADA cases outside the alcoholism context, some
circuits have applied a variation on the third element of an
employee's prima facie case. Rather than require employees to
prove they were fired "because of' their disability, these courts
require employees to prove only that they were fired under
circumstances that raise an "inference of' disability
discrimination. For instance, in Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
Robert Young, a maintenance employee at Warner-Jenkinson
Company, Inc. ("Warner-Jenkinson"), suffered a severe work-
related injury that led to part of his foot being amputated. 10
Young was eventually cleared to come back to work without
restrictions on March 28, 1995.111 In December of that same
year, Warner-Jenkinson informed Young that it had decided to
terminate him because of deficient job performance.11 2 Young
filed a disability discrimination charge with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").1 13 In response
to an inquiry by the EEOC, Warner-Jenkinson sent a letter
stating that Young was terminated because of lack of available
work and not because of performance deficiencies.1 1 4 The district
court granted summary judgment for Warner-Jenkinson, and
Young appealed, arguing that he was terminated because of his
disability in violation of the ADA.115
The Eighth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework because there was no direct evidence of
107 See Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms, 95 F.3d at 1106; Teahan, 951 F.2d at
516.
108 See Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms, 95 F.3d at 1107.
109 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000); see supra Part II.C.2.
110 Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 1998).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1021.
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discrimination. 116 The court, though, took a different approach
than other courts as to the third element of a plaintiffs prima
facie case of discrimination. 117 Instead of requiring the plaintiff
to prove he was discriminated against "because of' his disability,
the court only required proof that the adverse employment action
was suffered "under circumstances from which an inference of
unlawful discrimination arises."118  Warner-Jenkinson argued
that Young did not meet this element of the prima facie case
because he had not demonstrated circumstances from which the
existence of unlawful discrimination could be inferred. 119 The
court disagreed, noting that "an inference of discrimination may
be raised by evidence that a plaintiff was replaced by or treated
less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in
the plaintiffs protected class.' ' 20 The court also noted that the
threshold of proof is minimal to establish a prima facie case.' 2' It
is intended to create a rebuttable presumption and "to sharpen
the inquiry" to determine whether there has been intentional
discrimination. 122 Discriminatory action need not be proved in
the prima facie stage.123
The court concluded that Young had raised an inference of
discrimination with evidence of Warner-Jenkinson's inconsistent
explanations. 124 This shifted the burden of production to the
company to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action, which it met despite the
inconsistency of its reasons. 125 The burden was then shifted back
to Young to prove Warner-Jenkinson's proffered reason was
pretextual to the real reason of discrimination. 26 The court
concluded that the inconsistency in Warner-Jenkinson's reasons
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons
were a pretext to disability discrimination; therefore, summary
judgment was denied. 127
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1021-22.
118 Id. at 1022.
119 Id.
120 Id. (quoting Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 1996)).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1022 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 Id. at 1022-23.
124 Id. at 1022.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 1022-23.
127 See id. at 1023.
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Unlike the inflexible per se rules of the "Not Because of the
Disability" and the "Because of the Disability" approaches, the
"Inference of' approach allows employees to prove their prima
facie case if they can offer circumstantial evidence that creates
an inference that the adverse employment action was actually
because of the alcoholism. This is a more flexible approach
because it allows employers to offer the alcohol-related
misconduct as a legitimate reason for the action, while also
protecting employees from being pretextually discriminated
against because of their alcoholism.
4. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez and Its Effect on Alcohol-Related
Misconduct
Although the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly
ruled on whether disability-related misconduct is "because of' the
disability, it has indirectly spoken on the issue.128 In Raytheon
Co. v. Hernandez, the Court considered the issue of disability-
related misconduct. 129 The Court granted certiorari to decide
"whether the ADA confers preferential rehire rights on disabled
employees lawfully terminated for violating workplace conduct
rules."'130 Unfortunately, the Court never answered this question
because it determined that the Ninth Circuit had applied a
disparate impact analysis when it should have only applied a
disparate treatment analysis. 13' Nonetheless, the Court provided
guidance on what the proper approach may be to disability-
related misconduct.
In Raytheon, the plaintiff, Joel Hernandez, was forced to
resign in lieu of being discharged because he tested positive for
cocaine while at work. 3 2 Over two years later he returned to
Raytheon and applied for rehire. 33 Despite having a reference
letter from his pastor and another from his Alcoholics
128 Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). Raytheon acquired the
defendant employer in this case, Hughes Missile Systems Company, subsequent to
the employer's decision not to rehire the plaintiff. Id. at 46-48 & n.1. In the Ninth
Circuit, this case was captioned as Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 298
F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002). For the sake of clarity, this Article refers to the employer
as "Raytheon" or "the employer" and to the case as Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, its
caption before the Supreme Court.
129 See Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 46.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 54-55.
132 Id. at 47.
133 Id.
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Anonymous counselor, Hernandez was not rehired. 134 Raytheon
claimed it had a company policy against rehiring employees who
had been terminated for misconduct, but Hernandez claimed it
was because of his addiction, which violated the ADA.135
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court that
Hernandez had failed to timely raise his disparate impact claim;
therefore, it only analyzed his disparate treatment claim under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 136 During
this analysis, it determined that Hernandez had proved his
prima facie case of discrimination because there were genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether he was qualified for the
job and whether he was not rehired because of his disability. 137
This shifted the burden to Raytheon, who contended that it had
applied a neutral policy against rehiring employees previously
terminated for violating workplace conduct rules, which was "a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" not to rehire Hernandez. 138
The Ninth Circuit found that the employer's no-rehire policy was
lawful on its face; however, it found that "[this] policy was not a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for not rehiring Hernandez
because the policy unlawfully discriminated against drug addicts
whose only work-related offense was failing a drug test due to
their addiction. 139
The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit had erred
by confusing the analytical frameworks for disparate impact and
disparate treatment. 140 It had incorrectly applied a disparate
impact analysis to a disparate treatment claim by holding "that a
neutral no-rehire policy could never suffice in a case where the
employee was terminated for illegal drug use, because such a
134 Id.
135 Id. at 48.
136 See id. at 49. The burden-shifting framework for a disparate treatment case
starts with the burden on the plaintiff, who must prove a prima facie case of
discrimination that he was a "qualified individual with a disability" and that he was
terminated "because of' his disability. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-03 (1973). If plaintiff meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the
defendant employer "to articulate [a] legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its
employment action. Id. If the employer meets this burden, then the presumption of
intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate
treatment by demonstrating that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual. Id.
137 See Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49-50.
138 Id. at 50-51.
139 Id. at 51.
140 See id.
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policy has a disparate impact on recovering drug addicts." 141 The
Supreme Court found that if the Ninth Circuit had applied the
correct disparate treatment framework, it would have been clear
that "a neutral no-rehire policy is, by definition, a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason under the ADA." 142 That would shift
the burden back to the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence
from which a jury could conclude that the employer's stated
reason was pretextual to the actual reason, disability
discrimination.' 43  The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for a proper disparate
treatment analysis. 144
Although the Court did not rule on whether the ADA confers
preferential rehire rights on disabled employees lawfully
terminated for violating workplace conduct rules, the Court did
provide considerable guidance on which of the lower courts'
approaches is correct. 145 One scholar has suggested that the
Court implicitly rejected the Teahan "Because of the Disability"
approach to disability-related misconduct. 146 This argument is
based on the Court's note that referred to the Ninth Circuit's
suggestion that it was a violation of the ADA to not rehire
plaintiff because of his disability-related misconduct. 147  The
Court stated that this suggestion was inconsistent with the
Court's rejection of a similar argument in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins.148
In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court held that terminating
an employee to prevent his pension from vesting was not
discrimination because of age under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, even though pensions are empirically
correlated with age.1 49 The Court did not, however, preclude the
141 Id.
142 Id. at 51-52.
143 Id. at 52.
144 Id. at 55.
145 Id. at 51-55; Timmons, supra note 7, at 231.
146 See Timmons, supra note 7, at 235.
147 Id.; see also Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 54 n.6 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)).
148 Timmons, supra note 7, at 235; see also Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 54 n.6 (citing
Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611).
149 Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611-12. The Court explained that because
employee pensions vested after a certain number of years of service, rather than at a
specific age, the employer that terminated an employee to avoid the expense of
pension-vesting would not make that decision based on age, but rather years of
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possibility that an employer who acts on the assumption that
there is a correlation between age and pensions vesting could be
liable for age discrimination. 150 This seems to leave open the
possibility that there may be an ADA claim when an employer
assumes a correlation between alcoholism and excessive
absenteeism, and then disciplines an employee based on that
assumption. The employee would have to prove that his
absenteeism was just a pretext to actually being fired for
alcoholism. 151 As the Supreme Court only implicitly reached the
issue of disability-related misconduct, it left open the possibility
of several circuit court approaches.
B. Reasonable Accommodation
Retroactive accommodation is generally not required by most
courts if employees have not notified the employer of their
disability. 152 If an employee requests reasonable accommodation
before the misconduct has taken place, however, and the
accommodation will allow him or her to successfully adhere to
performance and behavior standards, the employer must provide
accommodation, unless it causes undue hardship. 53 This general
rule "encourag[es] employees to seek diagnosis and treatment of
their disabilities as soon as possible and to discuss with their
employers likely difficulties in following workplace conduct rules
before they arise."15 4  This also reduces the incentive for
employees, after they have been discharged, to claim they are
disabled and should have been accommodated.1 55 Other courts
have provided a possible framework for employers to use in
accommodating an alcoholic employee. 156 These courts require
an employer to accommodate the alcoholic employee when it
suspects the misconduct is related to alcoholism. 57
service. Id. at 610-12. The Court further stated that "there is no disparate
treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature
other than the employee's age." Id. at 609.
150 Id. at 612-13.
151 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 52 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 804 (1973)).
152 Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
153 Timmons, supra note 7, at 283.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1989).
157 Id.
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1. Under the "Five Step" Approach, the Duty to Accommodate
Arises When Employer Suspects Misconduct Is Related to
Alcoholism
Rodgers v. Lehman provides a possible framework for
analyzing what the employer must do to reasonably
accommodate an alcoholic employee. 158 In Rodgers, the plaintiff,
John Rodgers, had a serious absenteeism problem that was
caused by his alcoholism. 159 He refused outpatient treatment
and counseling services offered by his employer on numerous
occasions, despite his employer offering to readjust his work
schedule to accommodate the program. 160 Rodgers finally made
several voluntary attempts at treatment and attended Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, but he was unsuccessful at recovery. 161
After two suspensions failed to correct the misconduct, Rodgers
was terminated.162 He then brought a claim under the
Rehabilitation Act. 163
The Fourth Circuit held that when dealing with an alcoholic
employee, the employer must follow a progressive course of
action. 164 It set out the procedure an employer must follow when
dealing with the problems of an alcoholic employee. 16 5 An
employer should first inform the employee of available counseling
services when it suspects that the job misconduct is related to
alcoholism. If the misconduct continues, the employee should be
provided with a "firm choice" between treatment and discipline,
with the treatments suggested providing an opportunity for
outpatient treatment, unless inpatient treatment is immediately
necessary. At this point, the employer should impose progressive
discipline for continued misconduct. If outpatient treatment
fails, then the employee should be provided with opportunity for
inpatient treatment, unless this would place an undue hardship
on the employer. Finally, if the employee relapses after
completing the inpatient treatment, his or her termination will
158 Id.
159 Id. at 255.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 255-56.
162 Id. at 256.
163 Id. at 254.
164 See id. at 259.
165 See id.
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be presumed reasonable and can only be rebutted if it was his or
her first relapse after a prolonged period of abstinence. 166
The court found that reasonable accommodation for the
alcoholic was a balance between the "excessive sensitivity" of
allowing the alcoholic continued treatment and opportunity to
fail, and the "undue rigor" of firmly confronting the alcoholic with
consequences for his actions. 167 The court determined that this
proper balance could be best accomplished through the
framework it laid out, allowing the alcoholic employee time to go
through the process of dealing with the disability, while at the
same time not allowing the process to continue forever. 168 The
Fourth Circuit held that although Rodgers had been treated with
extreme tolerance, he had been deprived of an opportunity to
participate in inpatient treatment before being discharged. 169
The court therefore ordered that Rodgers be reinstated to his
former position and given the appropriate ancillary relief.170
2. Under the "Employee Notification" Approach, the Duty to
Accommodate Only Arises When Employee Puts Employer
on Notice of the Disability
Subsequent to Rodgers, some courts rejected the idea that an
employer has an obligation to accommodate alcoholic employees
who have not asked for accommodation. 17 1 This rejection is based
on the fact that Rodgers was decided before the 1992
amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, which incorporated the
ADA provision that allows employers to hold alcoholic employees
to the same standards as other employees. 172 In Office of the
Senate Sergeant at Arms, discussed above,173 the plaintiff argued
that reasonable accommodation for his alcoholism was a "firm
choice and a fresh start."174 The employer argued that it was
allowed to hold alcoholic employees to the same standards as
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 259-60.
170 See id. at 260.
171 See, e.g., Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 314 (5th Cir. 1997); Johnson,
E.E.O.C. Dec. 03940100, 1996 WL 159072, at *3-4 (Mar. 28, 1996).
172 Burch, 119 F.3d at 320 n.14; Johnson, 1996 WL 159072, at *4.
173 See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
174 Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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other employees under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and
therefore, a "firm choice and fresh start" are not required. 175 It
argued that retroactive accommodation would be treating
alcoholic employees more favorably than other employees who
violated workplace rules.176
The Federal Circuit found that a "firm choice" between
treatment and discipline is consistent with reasonable
accommodation of the alcoholic employee. 177 At the same time, it
also found that the ADA does not require a "fresh start" through
retroactive accommodation. 178 Furthermore, the court held that
an employer's duty to reasonably accommodate only arises when
the employer knows of the employee's disability. 179 Requiring
retroactive accommodation when an employer had only partial,
speculative, or hearsay knowledge, the court held, would be
contrary to the plain language'80 and the legislative history of the
statute. 8 1  Therefore, under the Federal Circuit's approach,
employees who notify their employer of their alcoholism only
after it has resulted in misconduct are not entitled to reasonable
accommodation for their disability because the employer was not
notified of the disability before the misconduct occurred.
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
An alcoholic employee is limited to two of the three possible
ADA claims. Therefore, it is extremely important to protect
these two. To do this, courts must adopt the correct
framework for analyzing disparate treatment and reasonable
accommodation claims.
A. Disparate Treatment
Although the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the Teahan
approach of a discharge because of disability-related misconduct
175 Id.
176 See id.
177 Id. at 1107.
178 Id.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 1107. The plain language of the statute indicates that an
employer's "duty to accommodate is triggered by its knowledge of the disability." Id.
is' See id. (discussing the legislative history and how "the legislation clearly
states that employers are obligated to make reasonable accommodations only to the
'known' physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability").
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being per se disparate treatment, the Court left open the
possibility that in some situations there could be disparate
treatment when the discharge is alleged to have only been
because of disability-related misconduct.18 2 In remanding the
case, the Court stated that the only thing left to determine was
whether the employer used its neutral no-rehire policy as a
pretext for actually not rehiring the plaintiff for being a drug
addict. 8 3 Further evidence that the Court may allow a disparate
treatment claim when disability-related misconduct is used as a
pretext to the actual reason for the adverse employment action is
found in the statement made by the Court in Hazen Paper.
There, the Court stated that discharging on the assumption of a
correlation between pensions vesting and age may be found to be
age discrimination. 8 4  This statement is analogous to an
employer discharging an employee on the assumption of a
correlation between absenteeism and alcoholism. The Supreme
Court's statements in Raytheon and Hazen Paper are strong
evidence of the importance of preventing employers from using
disability-related misconduct as a pretext for an adverse
employment action because of the employee's disability. To
ensure that employers are prevented from doing so, it is vital
that the correct framework is applied to a disparate treatment
claim.
1. Problems with the "Not Because of Disability" Approach
A majority of courts separate the disability-related
misconduct from the disability.8 5 These courts hold that the
disability-related misconduct is "Not Because of the
Disability."'1 6 The problem with this approach is that it is a per
se rule that fails to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework, which prevents employees from having the
opportunity to prove pretext.'8 7
The "Not Because of the Disability" approach leaves alcoholic
employees, who are protected under the ADA, without a remedy
when they are pretextually discriminated against because of
182 See Timmons, supra note 7, at 238-39.
183 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
184 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993).
185 See Pernice v. City of Chi., 237 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2001).
186 Id. at 786-87.
187 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 806 (1973).
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their disability. The ADA already explicitly prohibits alcoholics
from bringing a disparate impact claim.188 They can only get
reasonable accommodation if they put the employer on notice of
their alcoholism,18 9 which many times they do not do until
something happens. Additionally, under the "Not Because of the
Disability" approach, they are incapable of proving a prima facie
case of disparate treatment if the employer gives the misconduct
as the reason for the action. This allows the employer to freely
discriminate against alcoholic employees, as long as the
discrimination is based on the employees' misconduct, and not
due to their disability, regardless of whether the misconduct was
a pretext to hide disability discrimination.
Take for example, an alcoholic employee who misses work
because of alcoholism. The employee comes in the next day and
notifies the employer that the reason for the absence was
alcoholism. The employer fires him or her, saying it is against
company policy to miss work without an excuse. However, other
non-alcoholic employees have missed work without an excuse in
the past and have not been fired. In this situation, we already
know that the alcoholic is barred from a disparate impact claim.
The employee did not notify the employer of the disability until
after the misconduct, so according to some courts, the employee
is barred from a reasonable accommodation claim. 190 If the "Not
Because of Disability" approach is followed, the employee will be
unable to prove that the discrimination was "because of' the
disability, due to a lack of direct evidence. The employee will
then be prevented from making out a prima facie case of
disparate treatment. The employer will not be required to prove
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, and the
employee will not be given the opportunity to prove pretext. This
leaves alcoholic employees, who are actually discriminated
against "because of' a disability, without any claim at all, even
though they ostensibly are protected by the ADA.
2. Problems with the "Because of the Disability" Approach
The Teahan court adopted an approach that an adverse
employment action because of disability-related misconduct is
188 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (2000).
189 See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 314, 319 (5th Cir. 1997).
190 See id. at 319; Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair
Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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per se "Because of the Disability."1 91 There are three problems
with this approach: (1) it has been implicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court; 192 (2) it is inconsistent with the ADA; 193 and (3) it
is unfair because it does not give employers the opportunity to
use alcoholic employees' misconduct as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
First, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the "Because of
the Disability" approach to disability-related misconduct in
Raytheon.194 In Raytheon, the Court noted that any suggestion
that the ADA is violated when an employee is not rehired
because of his disability-related misconduct is inconsistent with
the Court's rejection of a similar argument in a case involving the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. In that case, the
Court held that termination to prevent a pension from vesting
was not because of age, even though pensions are empirically
correlated with age. 195 Because the Supreme Court would more
than likely reverse any court applying the "Because of the
Disability" approach, courts should not use it.
Second, the "Because of the Disability" approach is
inconsistent with the ADA's provision that allows employers to
hold alcoholic and drug-addicted employees to the same
standards as other employees. 196 Eliminating the distinction
between the disability-related misconduct and the disability
prevents employers from holding these employees to the same
standards. Even though this provision only explicitly prevents
alcoholic employees from bringing disparate impact claims, by
applying a rule that an adverse employment action based on the
alcoholic's misconduct is per se "Because of the Disability," the
employer is prevented from holding these employees to the same
standards as other employees.
For example, assume that an employer has a policy against
absenteeism and an alcoholic employee is absent from work
because of his or her alcoholism. Applying the "Because of the
Disability" approach, the employer would be prevented from
taking action against the alcoholic employee because the conduct
191 Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1991).
192 Timmons, supra note 7, at 236; see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S.
44, 55 n.6 (2003).
193 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b).
194 Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 55 n.6.
195 Id.
196 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4).
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was related to his or her alcoholism, even though it has a policy
against this type of conduct. If the employer did take action, it
would be liable for disparate treatment. The effect of this would
be to prohibit the employer from holding the alcoholic employee
to the same standards as it holds other employees, which the
ADA expressly allows the employer to do. 197
Third, an adverse employment action based on disability-
related misconduct as per se "Because of the Disability" prevents
the employer from offering the misconduct as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. If disability-related misconduct and
the actual disability are one and the same, then a termination
"because of' this disability-related misconduct could never be a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Using the previous
example, imagine that alcoholism causes an employee to be
absent from work. Under the "Because of the Disability"
approach, this would be per se disability discrimination. The
court would not even have to go through the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. Even if it did, the employer would be
prevented from offering the employee's absenteeism as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action because the
alcohol-related absenteeism was already determined to be
"Because of the Disability." The employer's reason for the
adverse action cannot be "Because of the Disability" and
legitimate and nondiscriminatory at the same time.
The effect of this would be to allow the employee to take to
the jury any claim that he was discriminated against because of
disability-related misconduct, as long as he could prove a
question of fact as to whether he was "otherwise qualified with
reasonable accommodation." As will be discussed below, this
reasonable accommodation could be something as easy as time off
to attend rehabilitation. Although an employee's prima facie
case is a minimal burden, so is the employer's burden to prove a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 19 The "Because of the
Disability" approach makes the employer's burden more than
minimal-maybe even impossible. Therefore, this approach
should not be adopted.
197 See id.
198 Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 152 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 1998).
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3. Why the "Inference of' Approach Should Be Adopted
Under the burden-shifting approach, before having to
establish pretext, the employee must establish a prima facie case
of disability discrimination. 199  Most courts require that
employees prove they were fired "because of' their disability,200
which can be a difficult task for the employee who was fired
allegedly for disability-related misconduct. Courts should
abandon this "because of' requirement for a prima facie case and
replace it with the "terminated under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of disability discrimination" approach that some
courts have used.20 1 This "Inference of' approach would allow the
plaintiff to prove discrimination with circumstantial evidence,
which is the reason for the burden-shifting approach. 20 2 A
"qualified individual with a disability" should be able to create
this inference by showing a causal connection between the
conduct he was allegedly fired for, and the disability.20 3 This
approach makes the per se "Because of the Disability" approach
unnecessary because the plaintiffs prima facie case could be
proved through the causal connection, 20 4 without prohibiting the
employer from using the misconduct as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.
Using this approach to a prima facie case would give
employers the opportunity to prove a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the action, while also protecting an
alcoholic employee from being discriminated against
pretextually. Allowing an alcoholic employee to establish a
prima facie case by establishing a causal connection between his
absenteeism and his disability would shift the burden to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action. 20 5 Unlike the per se "Because
of the Disability" approach, here the defendant could articulate
this simply by giving the misconduct/absenteeism as the reason
for the action. This would shift the burden back to the plaintiff
199 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973).
200 See Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2003).
201 Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 395 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
202 Timmons, supra note 7, at 241.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
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to prove that the proffered reason was pretextual. 20 6 Pretext
could be proved by providing evidence, such as non-alcoholic
employees being treated differently for the same misconduct,
which would allow a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff. This
"Inference of' approach to disability-related misconduct, unlike
the two per se approaches, protects both the employer's right to
prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, and the employee's right to prove that reason
was a pretext for the actual reason, the disability. Therefore,
this approach should be adopted by the courts.
Going through the proper burden-shifting framework may
seem like a long and drawn out way to come up with the same
result. Many times this framework will yield the same result,
such as in cases where the employee engaged in egregious
misconduct. However, the proper framework is necessary to
protect the employees who have been discriminated against not
because of their misconduct, but because of their disability.
Using the "Not Because of the Disability" approach to strike
down disability-related misconduct claims simply because there
is no direct evidence that the employee was fired "because of'
their disability would leave employers free to discriminate
against the disabled by giving misconduct as the reason for the
action. This would allow the employer to pretextually
discriminate against employees because of their disability.
Alternatively, using the "Because of the Disability" approach
would allow almost all disabled employees to tie up the courts by
claiming the misconduct for which they were fired was a result of
their disability, without having to prove that the employer used
their misconduct as a pretext to terminate them because of their
disability. Allowing so many meritless claims to establish a
prima facie case would waste the courts' resources and be too
burdensome on employers. Furthermore, the "Because of the
Disability" approach has been implicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court, it contradicts the plain language of the ADA, and it
prevents the employer from using the misconduct as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
The proper approach lies somewhere in the middle, only allowing
disability-related misconduct claimants to establish a prima facie
206 Id.
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case if employees can show that they were fired under
circumstances giving an "Inference of' disability discrimination.
B. Reasonable Accommodation
Discrimination against people with disabilities "cost[s] the
United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and non-productivity. ' 207 It has been
reported by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism that alcohol abuse costs the United States an
estimated $185 billion dollars a year.20 Almost half of this
amount, an astounding $88 billion, comes from lost productivity
at work caused by hangovers and other alcohol-related
diseases. 20 9  This loss in productivity can be improved by
adopting the proper approach to reasonable accommodation for
the alcoholic employee.
1. Problems with the "Employee Notification" Approach
Some courts have rejected the idea that employers have an
affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodations to
alcoholic employees without first being notified of the
disability.210 This approach fails to recognize some important
facts about disabilities. Many people with a disability, especially
alcoholism, are too embarrassed to reveal their disability.
Furthermore, many disabled employees believe that they can
hide their disability from their employer without having to go
through the humiliation of disclosing it to the people they work
for every day. They think the disability will not affect their job
performance. Not only that, but many alcoholics are in denial
about their disability. These employees would never ask for a
reasonable accommodation for their disability because they do
not believe they have one. Alcoholic employees are also less
likely than other disabled employees to be familiar with the law.
Because they do not think they are disabled, they are less likely
than other disabled individuals to have learned about the
207 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2000).
208 Matthew Herper, Cutting Alcohol's Cost, FORBES.cOM, Aug. 22, 2006, http://
www.forbes.com/2006/08/22/healthdrinkingproblemscxmhnightlife06_0822
costs.html.
209 Id.
210 See Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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protections of disability law. They may believe that they can be
discharged or not hired if the employer finds out they are an
alcoholic. These alcoholic employees likely are afraid that the
employer will take action against them because of their
disability. Requiring employees to notify their employer ignores
the facts about disabilities and cuts against the ADA's goals of
ensuring disabled individuals with equal opportunity, full
participation, and economic self-sufficiency. 211
On the other hand, an employer could not reasonably be
required to discover all of its employees' disabilities without
being notified. Requiring employees to notify their employers of
their disability and to request reasonable accommodation also
encourages employees to seek treatment for their disability in
order to prevent disability-related misconduct from occurring. 21 2
This also discourages non-disabled employees from claiming they
needed accommodation for their disability only after their
discharge. 213 These untruthful employees, however, would be
discouraged in the same way if they were offered a "firm choice"
between rehabilitation and termination. There would be few
employees who would go through an extended stay at a
rehabilitation treatment facility if they did not really need the
treatment. Most legitimate alcoholic or drug-addicted employees
do not even want to attend rehabilitation. Furthermore, most of
these dishonest employees would be discovered by the psychiatric
personnel at the rehabilitation clinic.
2. Why the "Five Step" Approach Should Be Adopted
The proper framework for reasonable accommodations of the
alcoholic employee is the "Five Step" analysis from Rodgers v.
Lehman.21 4 In Rodgers, the Fourth Circuit used this approach to
find a balance between "excessive sensitivity" and "undue
rigor."21 5 First, this requires the employer to let the employee
know of the available counseling services when it suspects the
misconduct is alcohol-related. 21 6 Suspicion of alcoholism could
arise if the employee notified the employer of the disability or if
211 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000).
212 Timmons, supra note 7, at 283.
213 Id.
214 Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
215 Id. at 259.
216 Id.
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the employee's absenteeism was extensive enough that
disciplinary actions could be taken. If the absenteeism was bad
enough, the employer could notify the employee of the counseling
services available, without accusing him or her of being an
alcoholic.
Second, if the misconduct continued, the employer would
then be required to offer the employee a "firm choice" between
treatment and discipline. 217 Employees who denied being an
alcoholic or admitted to being an alcoholic and refused treatment
would be terminated. This would further the ADA's goals by
providing alcoholic employees with the opportunity to seek help
and keep their job, assuring them economic self-sufficiency. Non-
alcoholic employees would have the opportunity to claim they
were alcoholics; however, few would want to go through
treatment when they did not need to and most of those who did
would be discovered by the professionals at the treatment
facilities and turned in to the employer.
The third step of the Rodgers analysis gives alcoholic
employees who chose treatment the opportunity for outpatient
treatment.218 Fourth, the employee would progress to inpatient
treatment if it was necessary. 219  The Rodgers framework,
however, is not intended to be unlimited in duration. Under the
fifth step of the analysis, employees who relapse into their
alcoholic misconduct after completing inpatient treatment can be
discharged, and the discharge will be presumed reasonable. 220
This presumption is only rebuttable if it is the first relapse after
a prolonged period of abstinence. 221
This method of providing reasonable accommodation to the
alcoholic employee benefits employees as well as employers. The
employees' benefits are obvious. They receive an opportunity to
keep their jobs, which furthers the ADA's goal of allowing the
disabled to be economically self-sufficient. They also get a chance
at rehabilitation and now have an extra incentive to attend.
Providing alcoholic employees with these accommodations, in
turn, provides them with an equal opportunity to succeed in the
workplace, furthering another goal of the ADA.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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The "Five Step" approach is also advantageous to employers,
though the benefits are not as obvious. Employers spend a
substantial amount of money training employees, so losing one is
very costly. Being able to keep these trained employees, even if
they must provide time off during rehabilitation, will benefit
employers in the long run by allowing them to save money and
increase productivity. Attempting to rehabilitate alcoholic
employees is a burdensome task, but it will save employers
money, save the United States money, and further the goals of
the ADA.
CONCLUSION
Alcoholic employees are protected under the ADA, but are
expressly prohibited from bringing disparate impact claims.
Therefore, courts must be cautious in protecting these employees'
right to disparate treatment and reasonable accommodation
claims. In order for alcoholics, a protected class under the ADA
and Rehabilitation Act, to be adequately protected from disability
discrimination, it is necessary for courts to apply the proper
framework when analyzing their disparate treatment and
reasonable accommodation claims.
Some federal circuits use a per se rule for disparate
treatment claims that an adverse employment action because of
disability-related misconduct is "Not Because of the Disability."
This effectively bars alcoholic employees from bringing claims
when the employer's stated reason for the action is alcoholic-
related misconduct because the plaintiff lacks direct evidence
that it was actually because of his disability. This prevents
employees from having the opportunity to prove that the
employer's reason was pretextual and allows the employer to
discriminate. The Second Circuit has used a per se rule that an
adverse employment action because of disability-related
misconduct is "Because of the Disability." This approach has
been implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, goes against the
ADA, and prevents employers from offering the misconduct as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Furthermore, this
approach allows meritless claims to go to trial and ties up courts'
resources. Outside the disability-related context, some circuits
allow the plaintiff to prove his prima facie case if he can show he
was terminated under circumstances creating an inference of
disability-based discrimination. This Article argues that this
2008]
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"Inference of' approach is the better approach because it allows
employers to offer the employee misconduct as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action,
and it prevents employers from using alcohol-related misconduct
as a pretext for disability-based discrimination.
Some federal circuits require an employer to reasonably
accommodate an alcoholic employee only when the employer has
been put on notice of the disability and the employee has asked
for an accommodation. Other circuits require reasonable
accommodation when the employer suspects the misconduct is
alcohol related. This Article argues that the better approach is to
require the accommodation when the employer suspects the
misconduct is alcohol related because it furthers the goals of the
ADA by ensuring the disabled an equal opportunity, full
participation, and economic self-sufficiency. This approach is
also more beneficial to the employer in the long run, who
receives a trained, more productive, non-disabled employee.
Furthermore, this helps to deal with the problem of alcoholism
and saves the United States money by helping alcoholics become
rehabilitated and more self-sufficient.
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